Two Years into War, Ukrainian Orthodox Still Seek Unity
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Executive Summary:
As Ukraine enters into the third year of conflict, the Orthodox faithful remain disunited with no immediate prospects of reconciliation.
The bond between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) has not been severed, despite the latter claiming it has been.
The window of opportunity for reconciliation that existed briefly in 2022 has disappeared, partly due to the increased state scrutiny of the UOC-MP.
The time is not working in Met. Onufry’s favour (UOC-MP), whose church cannot remain in the status quo position for much longer, as new legislation is coming his way.
The Head of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine Met. Epifaniy appealed for much-needed unity that would help repel Russia in its efforts to destroy Ukraine’s independence and democracy at the Yalta European Strategy Forum in Kyiv, which took place on the second anniversary of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
“[N]ow we need so much unity in our common struggle. After all, we pay a very high price for our state, for democracy, for freedom today…If we allow internal contradictions and quarrels to divide us, then in the future we can pay an even higher price. A million times higher.”
Unity is indeed a special glue that binds Ukraine’s society, especially amid the relentless war waged by Vladimir Putin. Ukraine’s President Zelensky has managed to keep the nation together in the most challenging times and instil confidence that Ukraine will be victorious.
Can the same be said for the Orthodox churches? A simple scratch under the surface and Epifaniy’s remarks are somehow lost in the void. Orthodoxy in Ukraine remains deeply split as it was before the war, if not even more so.
A more unified Orthodoxy would make it harder for Putin to advance his military and political objectives in Ukraine. However, as we are marking the two years of the brutal war, the two biggest Orthodox Churches - the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) are as far apart as they’ve ever been. Instead of becoming a catalyst of unity, the war continues to cause deep divisions with no immediate prospects of healing.
The split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy that we are witnessing today has a similar connotation to the marking of the second anniversary of Putin’s war in Ukraine. In both cases, the processes we see today started way earlier. Ukraine has been at war with Russia since 2014 when Putin annexed Crimea and sponsored secessionist groups in the east of the country. Similarly, the current divisions in Ukraine’s Orthodoxy can be traced back to 2018/2019 (if not earlier) when the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Ever since both churches have been locked in a bitter confrontation over primacy.
The Orthodox Church of Ukraine, headed by Met. Epifaniy received much-needed international backing and legitimacy with the recognition by the Ecumenical Patriarch and three other sister churches (the Church of Greece, Cyprus and the Patriarchate of Alexandria). OCU’s foundations are based on the Kyiv Patriarchate and the work of Met. Filaret (Denysenko) who has been a strong supporter of Ukraine’s independence and a loud critic of Russia, the UOC-MP and its policies in Ukraine. The current leadership of OCU under Met. Epifaniy continued the practice of publicly scolding the UOC-MP, calling it a Russian proxy throughout the war.
On the opposite side sits the UOC-MP under the helm of Met. Onufry who was appointed to this position in 2014. The UOC-MP has been attacking the Orthodox Church of Ukraine ever since its establishment in 2018, calling it a political project and an artificial construct created by the West. The UOC-MP has been linked with the Russian Orthodox Church as its constituent part, albeit with limited independence (self-governing status).
Two years into the war – what has changed?
Being far away from united and trenched in divisions, the Ukrainian Orthodox scene is slowly but surely being changed by the war.
Probably the most notable change lies with the UOC-Moscow Patriarchate’s questionable push to distance itself from Patriarch Kirill and initiate a process for acquiring greater independence in May 2022. The UOC-MP Council’s decision to step away from the Russian Orthodox Church was puzzling, to say the least, as the church ultimately did not separate from Moscow and did not sever ties despite signalling that it would do so.
UOC-MP is still part of the wider communion of Orthodox churches through the linkage with the ROC. The puzzling part is that Onufry’s church took certain steps heading towards independence, such as removing the references to the Russian Orthodox Church in its official Statute and preparing its own holy chrism (a right which, in principle, is reserved for the autocephalous churches).
Many questions remain unanswered by this move. One such question is why Met. Onufry did not notify other local churches of his church’s independence. Following the updated Statute, the Ukrainian state authorised an expert audit of this new reality for the UOC-MP. It unsurprisingly concluded that the link with Patriarch Kirill is still unbroken.
The OCU and UOC-MP signalled each other early in the war (May 2022) about possible reconciliation. The UOC-MP expressed readiness for a dialogue with the OCU. However, this was a highly conditioned exercise, a dead-end from the beginning. Some of the conditions were unrealistic, including recognition by the OCU that their bishops have been appointed uncanonically and acceptance that they are not an autocephalous church.
Similarly, the OCU took a decisive step and called for the UOC-MP to unite with the OCU (May 2022). That window of opportunity taking shape in spring/summer 2022 was shortly after shut. These calls took place against the backdrop of the ongoing transfer of parishes from UOC-MP to OCU that had already been taking place (albeit with smaller intensity) since 2019, when the OCU received autocephaly. To date, several hundred parishes have transferred to the OCU. The war gave a new impetus to the transfer of parishes, which on some occasions has been highly confrontational, leading to tensions.
A possible factor contributing to the short-sighted calculations of the UOC-MP not to accept the hand given by OCU can be traced partially to the greater state scrutiny towards it, which was prompted by the Russian full-scale invasion. The UOC-MP remains one of the last institutional links to Moscow. Patriarch Kirill sanctified and justified Putin’s actions on numerous occasions.
Several state actions have further estranged the relationship between the state and the UOC-MP, which was already on shaky grounds. Onufry’s church had repeatedly complained about state pressure and its adverse effects on freedom of religion.
In the past two years, there have been numerous cases of UOC- MP representatives who have been accused and indicted for working against Ukraine and for the interest of the Russian Federation (state treason, collaboration, and inciting religious hatred). Ukrainian SBU has launched 68 criminal cases against UOC-MP representatives (October 2023 figures).
Furthermore, the cases involving the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (one of the holiest sites for Orthodox Christians), where the state did not extend, but terminated, the agreement with the UOC-MP, were also perceived and presented to the public as persecution by the state.
Lastly, while the UOC-MP has been vocal in expressing its anger over the transfer of parishes to the OCU, it has taken a rather laid-back position amidst the blatant annexation of its eparchies by the church it formally still belongs to - the ROC. Onufry’s superior, Patriarch Kirill, had been annexing UOC-MP eparchies that were located in the areas that Russia had occupied in Ukraine.
All of this has led to the sharp decline of the believers affiliated with the UOC-MP and a steady increase in those affiliated with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. According to a 2022 survey, 54% of the interviewed belong to the OCU, and only 4% to the UOC-MP.
In such complex and ever-changing circumstances, due to the war is Met. Epifaniy’s call for unity going to be heard across the churches of UOC-MP and amongst its believers?
Most likely, the answer will be - not really. There is practically little movement on the other side of the table where Met. Onufry sits. It is widely speculated that he has suspended any communication with Patriarch Kirill. From a distance, he seems relatively isolated from the developments around him. Formally, there haven’t been any new church initiatives on either side that could spark any rapprochement.
Like many times in the past, external events can create a new window of opportunity. Ukrainian autocephaly of 2019 is one such example. The Ukrainian state has been working on legislation that would effectively ban religious organisations that are tied to an aggressor state – in this case, Russia. Any such decision would have to go through the courts first. The draft law passed its first reading in Ukraine’s parliament in October 2023 and is expected to go through another vote soon, after which it will be sent for President Zelensky to sign.
This highly controversial move would affect the functioning of Onufry’s church unless this church completely breaks away from Moscow. Depending on the course of action the UOC-MP will take, it may also reignite the discussion from early 2022 about possible unification with OCU.
Andreja Bogdanovski
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Read last week’s Ortho. politics round-up:
Very instructive et so we'll written. Thanx