Lithuania's Bold Move Sparks Constantinople's Expansion, Russian Orthodox Church Contemplates Countermove
The robust Lithuanian state involvement in rearranging the Orthodox landscape in the country makes room for further expansion of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Baltics.
The recent news about the establishment of an exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarch in Lithuania, as well as the decision of the Estonian officials to expel the head of the Estonian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate from the county, shows unprecedented activity in the Orthodox religious landscape currently shaping up in the Baltic states.
The Russian aggression of Ukraine has created momentum for dismantling the long-standing modus operandi of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in this region.
Will the ROC’s setup abroad be resilient enough to survive the increased state involvement in rearranging the religious map, or will the ROC's network crumble down as the Ecumenical Patriarchate expands north?
The war in Ukraine has been having a monumental impact on the functioning of the Orthodox church. What preceded the Russian aggression of 2022 was the church battle of primacy between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate- fought over the Ukrainian church independence (autocephaly) granted in January 2019. The effects of this enormously important decision are slowly but surely expanding north and south of Ukraine, challenging Moscow’s Orthodox primacy across Eastern Europe, which has been rarely contested and understood as the exclusive canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate for many years.
The Russian aggression has intensified the uncertainty over Patriarch Kirill’s canonical territories by prompting state scrutiny of the relationship between Moscow and the Orthodox churches under his control.
The Russian Orthodox Church has extended reach into the three Baltic republics. While increasingly secular (especially in Estonia’s case), the Russian-speaking communities comprise sizeable minority groups. The Russian Orthodox Church is represented in the three countries through different organisational setups (self-governing churches and a diocese). The overarching control in both models lies with the Russian Patriarch. For many years, the Lithuanian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate had the status of a diocese, unlike the Moscow-tied churches in Estonia and Latvia, which enjoy the status of self-governing churches, albeit still linked with Patriarch Kirill.
Due to the fast-paced developments and the implications across the political landscape in Eastern Europe, I will be unpacking the responses of the Orthodox Churches in the Baltics to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the coming weeks.
This week’s main piece is about the changing situation in Lithuania.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate (re)established its presence in Lithuania early this year after Fr Justinus Kiviloo was announced to lead the new Lithuanian Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Fr Justinus (an Estonian with Ukraine roots) had the first celebration in Vilnius at the beginning of January. He commented that the establishment of the Lithuanian exarchate is nearly complete, with a few legal and administrative matters that need to be resolved.
Currently, the Lithuanian exarchate is composed of former clergy of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate, which have been defrocked by the head of the church (Metropolitan Innokentiy) because of “schismatic activity”. They have been reinstated by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew because the imposed penalty was a politically motivated decision (support of Ukraine) and not of dogmatic and ecclesiastical reasoning. In February 2023, the Ecumenical Patriarch took the clergymen under his omophorion.
The establishment of the Lithuanian Exarchate in January coincided with the US Secretary of State International Religious Freedom Award being given to (among others) the five former Moscow-tied Lithuanian Orthodox Church members who rebelled against Met. Innokentiy in 2022. They were rewarded for promoting and defending the freedom of religion globally.
State meddling: proportionate and necessary?
The Lithuanian state quickly engaged in reorganising the Orthodox terrain in the country after Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in March 2022.
Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė, in May 2022, wrote to the Ecumenical Patriarch asking him to get involved in establishing its presence in the country. She expressed the government’s readiness to assist the Ecumenical Patriarch in re-establishing the “Mother Church” after the group of priests who rebelled against Met. Innokentiy asked for EP’s involvement.
Lithuanian Prime Minister Šimonytė makes a clear case for why the government wants to further detach from Moscow, citing Kirill’s conduct and the blessing for the war.
Judging by Šimonytė’s public statements, the Lithuanian Orthodox Church – MP doesn’t seem to be perceived as a Russian asset (at least not publicly), unlike this has been the case in Estonia, for example. She stated in an interview in November 2022 that this is because of the predominantly Catholic character of the country and the minority Orthodox believers.
Lithuania’s main religion is Roman Catholicism. In 2021, 74% identified as Roman Catholics. The Moscow-tied Lithuanian Orthodox Church says that according to the 2021 census, 3,75% of the population were Orthodox, or around 100,000. Of course, this number would fluctuate, considering the number of Ukrainian refugees.
The country’s Prime Minister acknowledged Met. Innokentiy’s disagreement over Putin’s war, but she says that his decision to defrock the five clergy who wanted a much greater response from the church was a game changer for her and the government.
The other reason behind stepping up and involving the state in the matter is due to the number of Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war and the difficult situation they are in if they have to pray to Patriarch Kirill. “They would have no church to go to”, the country’s Prime Minister had said. This reasoning is also shared by the Lithuanian Parliament speaker Viktorija Čmilytė- Nilsen.
Estimates suggest that there are over 70,000 Ukrainian refugees who came to Lithuania. These statements by the country’s leadership imply that the government is working on ensuring freedom of religion by working with the EP.
The Lithuanian government seemed to have complete disregard for Met. Innokentiy's church track record opposing the war while being laser-focused on Batholomew. In response to the vigorous Vilnius-Phanar diplomacy, Met. Innokentiy wrote a rather angry letter to the country’s Prime Minister, sharing his disappointment that he has not been consulted about the activities taken towards the Ecumenical Patriarchate for an especially important topic such as church reorganisation in the country.
It's puzzling that none of these issues were discussed with Met. Innokentiy's church beforehand. Another important matter for consideration is whether the Lithuanian government went to the Phanar with a ready-made solution – i.e., an exarchate- or whether this was left to Bartholomew to decide.
At the centre of the Lithuanian state strategy, similar to Ukraine’s Poroshenko, is the argument that the territory of Lithuania was under the Ecumenical Patriarchate authority from the 13th century until 1686 as part of the Kyiv Metropolis and that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is the real “Mother church”. The transfer of jurisdiction to Moscow came later.
The Russian Orthodox Church, however, considers the territory of Lithuania as its canonical territory. Fr Volodymyr Sielavka, one of the defrocked priests, underlined the historical importance of EP’s actions in Lithuania and the establishment of the exarchate in the country, considering that it has been 300 years since EP representatives held a service there.
Šimonytė’s decision to engage the whole state apparatus is evident through the active involvement of many state officials: Prime Minister, Speaker of Parliament, Deputy Foreign Minister, and at an ambassador level. In July 2022, Patriarch Kirill was declared persona non-grata and barred from entering Lithuania.
The prospects for establishing an Ecumenical Patriarchate exarchate in the country were formally boosted with the signing of a cooperation agreement “on closer ties and cooperation,” which took place in March 2023 during a three days long visit of the EP Bartholomew to Vilnius. The agreement paved the way for the launch of the Lithuanian exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
During the visit, the EP met the former priests of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church, thanking them for their work in the country. It was reported that he also visited an old KGB building, now used as a museum (Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights). The Catholic Archbishop of Vilnius, Gintaras Grušas, accompanied him.
The highly orchestrated visit did not go without controversies as the Ecumenical Patriarch called out Met. Innokentiy for not welcoming the Ecumenical Patriarch and showing respect. It is fair to say that a lukewarm invitation was issued by the press service of Innokentiy’s church, inviting him to venerate the relics at the Orthodox Church of the Holy Spirit, which is the seat of the Lithuanian Orthodox Church. The EP met with the ambassadors of Turkey, Greece, and the USA in Vilnius.
How independent is the Lithuanian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate?
The first reactions to Putin’s war that came from the Diocese of Vilnius and Lithuania were encouraging. Metropolitan Innokentiy (a Russian citizen - appointed in 2010) defended Ukraine, expressing condemnation of Russia’s war against Ukraine (see also here). He also publicly disagreed with Patriarch Kirill’s conduct.
Furthermore, the church has issued a statement in which it clarifies that Patriarch Kirill is not mentioned in prayers (especially among faithful coming from Ukraine and Belarus) and that the church is independent in every possible way (moral, spiritual and financial) but only has a canonical attachment to the Russian Orthodox Church. Met. Innokentiy also announced charting a course for greater independence for his church by asking for a revision of the legal position of the Lithuanian church.
In July 2022, a special commission examining the appeal for greater independence from the Russian church was formed. At the time, the commission stated that it was looking at a model close to autonomy for the Lithuanian Orthodox Church. The issue has moved slightly since then. The Lithuanian church had formally asked the Russian Orthodox Church to grant the status of a self-governing church. In March 2023, the Holy Synod of the ROC moved the issue to the Council of Bishops for further consultations. Both models (autonomy and self-governing status) implicate that the bond with Patriarch Kirill would not be severed. The proposed self-governing model is even less so. Despite Met. Innokentiy’s efforts to show allegiance to the Lithuanian state, the process of detaching canonically from Moscow, has been slow and without guarantees.
For those in the new Lithuanian exarchate, the statements and the conduct against the war coming from the Lithuanian church don’t go far enough. Fr Gintaras Sungaila points out the example of Bishop Ambrose’s soft tones regarding the “Russian World” ideology, which he presents through the lens of 19th-century writers and composers such as Dostoyevsky.
The immediate response of Met. Innokentiy to the war in Ukraine was in the right direction. The doubts lie with the sluggishness in acquiring a new legal status for his church. Moreover, the concerns about the church's new status, which would still be subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church, are valid.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s decision to intervene might alleviate the uneasiness among many Ukrainian, Belarussian and Lithuanian believers who live in the country and don’t see fit to pray in a church that is still subordinated to Kirill after almost two years since the war broke. It would be interesting to see whether other communities would transition into the new exarchate and how many followers it would have.
One may argue that the Lithuanian state hastily intervened in the matter without any proper consultations with Met. Innokentiy, which further aggravated the situation. The actions by the state once again confirm that governments across Eastern Europe actively consider and intervene strongly in the religious sphere when assessing the impacts of the war in Ukraine.
I will finish this piece with the following quote by Prime Minister Šimonytė from March 2023.
“The state and its officials cannot interfere or try to influence the canonical decisions of Churches, but when they are made, it would be hypocritical to pretend that we don’t understand their importance.”
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Andreja
