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Executive Summary:
Estonia’s decision to expel the Head of the Estonian Orthodox Church - Moscow Patriarchate, signals a possible reevaluation of the Russian Orthodox Church's presence in the country. This follows a similar trajectory that can be observed across Eastern Europe as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Estonia’s Ministry of Interior has shown readiness and willingness to intervene and coordinate church affairs by making demands and threats to a religious leader.
The lack of specifics about Evgeny’s case leaves space for unnecessary confusion and speculation.
The Russian Orthodox Church retreats in the Baltics and contemplates the next moves. The question of a new leadership of the Estonian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate might fuel further tensions.
The Head of the Estonian Orthodox Church–Moscow Patriarchate (EOC-MP), Met. Evgeny was told to leave the country last week after Estonia’s state officials decided not to extend his residence permit, claiming that his work represents a national security risk due to his church’s subordination to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Similarly to Lithuania, Estonia’s government has shown resolute action in managing Orthodox relations after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The level and type of state engagement in both cases differs significantly.
Has the Estonian government gone too far by expelling the head of the Moscow-tied church, and more importantly, are we witnessing a new framework of church-state relationship where national security concerns trump freedom of religion?
Western policymakers often complain about the lack of understanding of the importance of the Orthodox Church in Putin’s aggression on Ukraine. As the Baltic states are increasingly showing uneasiness about a possible escalation of the war, they have been taking steps to minimise Putin’s reach by scrutinising the ROC-affiliated churches on their territory. The ROC remains one of Moscow's last institutional linkages in Eastern Europe.
How is Estonia responding?
Background
Estonia’s ecclesiastical organisation differs significantly from the other neighbouring countries in the Baltics and Eastern Europe because of the functioning of two parallel canonical Orthodox Churches – one under the Moscow Patriarchate and another under the Ecumenical Patriarchate (EP).[1] The Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC) is an autonomous Orthodox Church as part of the EP, which was re(established) in 1996 through government support because of a local conflict within the Moscow-tied church that erupted in the early 1990s.[2] The Ecumenical Patriarch had recognised the EAOC as the successor of the Estonian Orthodox Church that existed between 1923 and 1945, which was under its jurisdiction.
In 1993, the EOC-MP was given autonomy by the Russian Orthodox Church together with two other churches (Latvia and Moldova). However, this did not prevent a local schism, ultimately leading to the EAOC's establishment. The Russian Orthodox Church considered the territory of Estonia as strictly its canonical territory. It had protested greatly after the EP decided to accept the splinter church as an autonomous church. Similarly to the Ukrainian case of 2019 the ROC broke communion (briefly) with the EP in 1996. The establishment of the EAOC (current head of the church – Met. Stephanos) created tensions with the competing EOC–MP over property rights. Still, the Estonian state authorities successfully mediated, and the tensions have been addressed. The former patriarch of the ROC – Alexy II, visited Tallinn in 2003 and was awarded by the Estonian President.
Both the EOC-MP and the EAOC are active churches. The church headed by Met. Evgeny has more followers (estimates 170,000), while the EAOC which is under Met. Stephanos (EP) has around 30,000 adherents. Around 60,000 Ukrainian refugees have fled to Estonia, which would undoubtedly affect these figures. Orthodoxy remains the largest Christian denomination in a country that is increasingly secular.
Met. Evgeny forced to leave Estonia
The rhetoric between Moscow and Tallinn is heating up. In a bizarre move, the Russian state has put the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, on the “wanted list”. This news comes exactly a week after Estonian authorities, citing national security concerns, have requested the departure of the head of the church affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan Evgeny (legal name Valery Reshetnikov), by February 6th. Estonia’s foreign intelligence assesses that Russia is preparing for conflict with NATO in the next decade as it is doubling the number of troops on the borders with Finland and the Baltic states.
Since Estonia restored independence in 1991, local authorities have seen the ROC’s presence in the country with suspicion. Alicja Curanović wrote in 2012 that “the ROC is perceived by Tallinn as an outside subject acting in Russia’s interest, thus weakening Estonia’s sovereignty.”[3] Not much has changed since her writing and perhaps the expulsion of Met. Evgeny is a culmination of this mistrust.
The Estonian officials defend the decision not to extend Met. Evgeny’s permit and say that this is because of his controversial conduct and support for Russian aggression in Ukraine. The Estonian police noted that his previous permit extension occurred before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He was appointed as the head of the EOC-MP in 2018.
Estonia’s Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna stated that Met. Evgeny has been repeatedly warned about his behaviour, which has not changed. According to the Estonian police, the decision to expel the head of the Church targets explicitly Met. Evgeny and is not intended to impact the EOC-MP or its followers. Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets assured the state would not interfere in selecting a new church leader.
Met. Evgeny appealed the decision of the Estonian authorities, but the appeal was unsuccessful. He commented that the decision not to renew his residence permit was political:
I am quite certain that this is a political decision aimed against me specifically. However, I hope, taking on trust the interior minister's words, that this is not a decision against the church as a whole.
No explanation for his expulsion
The Estonian top politicians seem convinced of Met. Evgeny’s wrongdoings. This wasn’t always the case, as the Minister of Interior applauded Met. Evgeny, in several instances, for distancing himself from Moscow and Patriarch Kirill. What has changed in the assessment of the Estonian authorities?
Many still question this, including the Head of the Estonian Council of Churches, the Lutheran Archibishop Urmas Viilma. Commenting on the expulsion of Met. Evgeny, Viilma stated that “a significant proportion of the relevant information has not been made public, [and] it is difficult to evaluate the arguments.” He has asked the Police for a clarification about Evgeny’s case. The Estonian Council of Churches is an independent association of Christian churches and congregations in Estonia, where the EOC-MP is a member, along with the other religious organisations represented in the country.
Estonia’s Internal Security Service (known as KAPO) was also involved in the assessment of Met. Evgeny – confirming his actions as a “national security threat.” KAPO’s assessment is vague as well. It was reported that in assessing Evgeny’s case, they’ve taken into consideration the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and Patriarch Kirill in fuelling Putin’s war machinery, concluding without going much into detail that Kirill and Evgeny’s actions “have contributed to the implementation of Russia’s security policy in Estonia.” Reviewing the KAPO annual report for 2022/2023 gives the following indication:
Religion-based influence activities centre around the Russian Orthodox Church, which formulates expedient religious justifications for the political and military choices of the Russian leadership.
Estonia’s Intelligence services are known for adhering to democratic principles of accountability and transparency and are one of Europe’s leading agencies when it comes to democratic oversight. Therefore, the lack of specifics around Evgeny’s case leaves space for unnecessary confusion.
While Evgeny’s distancing from Patriarch Kirill was evident, it has been largely coordinated by the country’s Ministry of Interior and can be, perhaps, in the eyes of KAPO, seen as a facade. Here are a few instances where Met. Evgeny’s position on the Russian invasion is open to interpretation.
In an interview for the ETV in October 2022, he was asked about his position on the war, and he responded that he and his church are against war. When the interviewer pressured him to clarify, he said, “Against any war, just or unjust.” Can Met. Evgeny possibly consider Putin’s war as justifiable? Furthermore, when asked about his comments of Patriarch Kirill defending the war, he clarified that he only disagrees with the Patriarch’s position but doesn’t oppose his views, despite the pressure from society to do so. At the beginning of the war, Met. Evgeny also shared doubts about the war, pointing to the West as partly to blame for Putin’s invasion. His conduct in the abovementioned cases is not dissimilar to the other churches aligned with the ROC (see, for example, the Lithuanian case and Bishop Ambrose’s statements).
Ministry of Interior leads state intervention in church affairs
The dealings with Met. Evgeny show active state involvement, primarily through its Ministry of Internal Affairs. Since the Russian war against Ukraine, it has been exerting pressure by interfering in the internal processes of the church and asking it to behave a certain way. The state also has laid out the repercussions if the conditions aren’t met – the expulsion of the head of the church. The “stick and carrot” approach has been evident since the second half of 2022.
Here are two examples of how Estonia’s authorities managed to block Patriarch Kirill's ideological and political influence.
February 2023
There have been calls for Met. Evgeny’s removal by certain political factors, particularly after he sought to conduct a joint service with a group close to the Kremlin (KOOS) in February 2023. Met. Evgeny cancelled his appearance at the prayer, distancing himself from this group and stating that the church he led had fallen victim to a political provocation. Estonia’s Ministry of Interior greeted this. Minister Läänemets confirmed that if the church supported the protest, this would have been a basis for the expulsion of Met. Evgeny:
If the head of the Russian Orthodox Church crosses the red lines that we have set, where he somehow justifies the war in Ukraine or approves of the political positions of the Russian Orthodox Church, which have been expressed in Moscow or does something else, for example, such as organising this kind of political event together with this same pro-Kremlin party, then (his potential expulsion) would have been completely on the agenda.
October 2022
A few months earlier, Met. Evgeny was summoned to the Estonian Ministry of Interior to explain his views on Patriarch Kirill’s scandalous remarks about the war in which he said that those Russian soldiers dying in Ukraine would have their sins forgiven.
Estonia’s Minister of Interior Läänemets then made the following remark:
We are expecting a very concrete statement. First, to very clearly and concretely distance themselves from the words of Patriarch Kirill, and second, to assure both the Ministry of the Interior and the Estonian public that the Estonian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate [does not] exert (Russian) influence…
As a result of the Ministry of Interior pressure Met, Evgeny had opposed the war in Ukraine and disagreed with Patriarch Kirill's stance on forgiveness for Russian soldiers' actions by issuing a statement to the public. This was a coordinated move and demanded by Estonia’s Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice. Reshetnikov was given an ultimatum deadline, or he risked being deported to Russia.
After the statement, Estonia’s Interior Minister Läänemets commented that “[W]ith this [statement], the Estonian Orthodox Church is backing away from the words of the Russian Patriarch Kirill…” He then went a step further, saying that this type of statement is what the Ministry had expected and that Met. Evgeny’s right to stay in the country was not in question anymore. Another high-level representative of the Ministry of Interior, Undersecretary Raivo Küüt, characterised the meeting with Met. Evgeny as constructive, and that there have been no indications for the EOC-MP to be considered a national security threat.
The state's very hands-on involvement was seen as a step too far for the church. Namely, the EOC-MP Synod reacted to the increased demands by state authorities to voice their opinion on the ongoing war in Ukraine as “constant demands for political statements” as if the church or its leader were politicians. The Synod statement was met with disappointment by the country’s politicians, repeating that the church needs to distance itself from Kirill’s statement explicitly and that the Synod response was not to the liking of the state.
Closed case or opening Pandora's box?
The way the Ministry of Interior has been approaching this matter is by requesting Met. Evgeny and his church to publicly distance from Patriarch Kirill and the ROC. Whenever Kirill justified the war, the Estonian police would demand a public counter-reaction from Met. Evgeny.
Estonian state officials showed extraordinary knowledge of how Russian influence travels within the channels of the Orthodox Church. Their proactive approach in cutting those opportunities before “it’s too late” can be characterised as state intrusion in church affairs. The state, by doing so, wants to distance Met. Evgeny as far as possible from Patriarch Kirill. The tactics of Estonia’s authorities might also be seen as a foreign policy instrument for affecting ROC’s cohesion and making Kirill look weak by having opposing voices confronting him, such as those of Met. Evgeny.
The case with Reshetnikov creates the dilemma of maintaining security without affecting religious freedoms and rights. While it may look like the Estonian state has already made that choice, the statement that the authorities would not intervene in the election of the new church leader and that the steps taken towards Met. Evgeny are only towards him and not the church says that Estonia’s authorities are careful not to cross that fine line.
A point of contestation is who and how will lead the EOC-MP after his departure as Estonia’s authorities and Met. Evgeny have two clashing positions. Authorities in Tallinn expect new leadership to take over while Met. Evgeny claims he hasn’t quit his position nor was dismissed and that he would be leading the church from Russia.
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Andreja Bogdanovski
[1] The other exception (two parallel jurisdictions) can be seen in the Republic of Moldova.
[2] Alicja Curanović, The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy: Keeping God on Our Side, 1st ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 173,174
[3] Ibid, 174
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