Are we witnessing a resurgence of the Romanian Orthodox Church?
Executive summary
The Romanian Orthodox Church’s latest Holy Synod decisions angered the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as well as the Russian Orthodox Church in Moldova, leading to an inevitable clash.
OCU considers the creation of a separate Romanian church in Ukraine unacceptable and an intrusion into its canonical jurisdiction, prompting complaints to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew.
Metropolitan Vladimir (Moldovan Orthodox Church - under the ROC) calls the Romanian church for dialogue as more clergy and laity abandon his church for the Metropolis of Bessarabia.
Russian church representatives in its near-abroad feel abandoned by Patriarch Kirill.
Ahead of the Romanian Orthodox Church’s Centennial next year, which will celebrate 140 years since receiving autocephaly and 100 years since its status was elevated to the rank of Patriarchate, the Romanian Orthodox Church has been showing a resurgence of activity.
At the end of February, the Romanian Holy Synod adopted several decisions that have propelled the Romanian church into an open clash with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and the Russian Orthodox Church. Regarding Ukraine, the Synod greenlighted the creation of a separate church structure in Ukraine called the “Romanian Orthodox Church in Ukraine” to cater for the Romanian-speaking community of believers who live in western and southwestern Ukraine. At the same time, the Moldovan question became more explosive as the Romanian Orthodox Church reaffirmed its open-door policy encouraging the transition of clergy and laity of the Moscow-tied Orthodox Church (Moldovan Orthodox Church) into the Metropolis of Bessarabia (under the Romanian Patriarchate).
Is this foreign policy resurgence of the Romanian church going to lead to a further clash with the weakened Russian Orthodox Church and expansion of the Romanian church's presence in neighbouring countries as a result? The slow northern collapse of the ROC structures in the Baltics seems to be slowly moving south, putting Patriarch Kirill in the ever greater dilemma of how to respond to these developments. The head of the Moscow-tied church in Moldova, Metropolitan Vladimir, wrote to him last year that he felt abandoned by the Russian church in the wake of increased activity by the Romanian church in Moldova.
During the Holy Synod session at the end of February, the Romanian Orthodox Church made two decisions, which are the subject of today’s analysis. Concerning Ukraine, the Synod decided to “bless, encourage and support the initiatives of the Romanian Orthodox communities in Ukraine to re-establish communion with the Mother Church – the Romanian Patriarchate – through their legal organisation, in a religious structure called the Romanian Orthodox Church in Romania”. Regarding the situation in Moldova the Holy Synod confirmed that “all Romanian Orthodox clerics and their flocks from the Republic of Moldova who return to the Metropolis of Bessarabia are canonical clerics and blessed believers, and any disciplinary sanction directed against them on the grounds of their membership of the Romanian Orthodox Church is considered null and void.”
The Romanian church’s decision to get involved in Ukraine’s ecclesiastical matters stems directly from the Russian aggression on Ukraine and the effects the war has had on the religious map and religious dynamics in Ukraine.
The scale of the Russian aggression in Ukraine has necessitated increased state involvement in religious affairs. President Zelensky has been implementing a strategy to ensure Ukraine’s spiritual security. The activities of the ROC are scrutinised heavily by the Ukrainian state, and the already fragile relationships among the Orthodoxy communities after Ukrainian autocephaly in 2019 have become a source of instability.
The situation in terms of the Romanian involvement is far from clear-cut. The vast majority of the Romanian Orthodox believers are affiliated with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Met. Onuphry. Around one hundred parishes of Romanian-speaking Orthodox are spread across the Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, and Odessa regions in Ukraine. According to a report by Balkan Insight, Romanian believers are caught in the middle by the ongoing securitisation and rivalries in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, necessitating Romanian state and church intervention. At the same time, one needs to acknowledge that Romanian media space has been infiltrated with increased rhetoric about the persecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by Zelensky. This buzzphrase is one of the foundations of Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda. The Ukrainian SBU examined several high-profile cases of UOC representatives in these regions.
The Romanian intrusion into the Ukrainian ecclesiastical space was condemned by all the parties concerned (OCU, UOC, and even the ROC). The Orthodox Church of Ukraine issued the loudest reaction. Although OCU is not the church that would receive the most direct blow from the Romanian efforts, the sharp reaction by Met. Epifaniy’s church makes sense due to the strategic nature of the Romanian church intrusion. It meant a direct violation of the Tomos of autocephaly given by the Ecumenical Patriarch, in which the OCU is the sole Orthodox body that can claim canonical jurisdiction in the entire territory of Ukraine. The OCU response is multi-layered. At the Holy Synod session on 7 March, it agreed to send letters to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and the Romanian Patriarch Daniel explaining OCU’s position. The OCU Synod also reminded the Romanian church about the ethnophyletic nature of the Romanian church decision, meaning the blessing of a church structure solely based on ethnic and national characteristics.
The Romanian church has so far not recognised the Orthodox Church of Ukraine’s autocephaly. Therefore, any communication with the OCU on the matter will be awkward. As a gesture of goodwill and recognition of the needs of the Romanian-speaking communities in 2019, OCU set up a Romanian vicariate responsible for the areas where predominantly ethnic Romanian communities live. OCU’s Holy Synod, in their reaction from 7 March, said that they hoped that the ongoing disagreements could be resolved in the spirit of fraternal love and canonical order.
The initial reactions of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine representatives were far from signs of fraternal love. OCU’s Bishop Victor (Bed) of Mukachevo and the Carpathian region called the Romanian synod decision a blatant provocation. He blamed the Romanian church and state authorities for being under the influence of the Russian FSB. Furthermore, according to the bishop, the aggressive step by the Romanian church explains the reason why this church has so far not recognised OCU’s independence.
The Romanian state’s involvement in the matter is an escalation in these developments, which brings more questions about the nature of the move. A Romanian church spokesperson told Balkan Insight that the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be involved in consultations “with the political and religious authorities in Kyiv…” about the ongoing situation. At the moment, it is unclear how this decision of the Romanian church will be implemented in Ukraine and whether, for example, the new church would need to be registered first under Ukrainian legislation, which would undoubtedly invite further Ukrainian state involvement and further complications.
Even though the move of the Romanian church will primarily affect the Ukrainian Orthodox Church headed by Met. Onufry, no concrete counteractions were taken by the UOC. In its statement, the UOC says that it has been surprised by the decision, commenting that the nature of the decision is anticanonical. The UOC reassured the Romanian church that Romanian-speaking parishioners are well looked after in its church.
As far as the ROC’s church’s reaction is concerned, it is evident that Patriarch Kirill is showing more interest in Romanian activities in Moldova than in Ukraine. The ROC took note of and criticised the Romanian church's open-door policy of accepting transitions of Moldovan Orthodox Church clerics into the Metropolis of Bessarabia. Met. Anthony (DECR) received instructions to follow the situation closely and come up with a set of recommendations for tackling the problem.
Only last year, some fifty priests left the Moldovan church for the Metropolis of Bessarabia. The push and pull factors for and against such transition have been changing over time. Patriarch Kirill’s support of the war had an effect on some of the transitions. Several priests of the Moldovan church in 2023 asked Met. Vladimir to cut ties with the ROC and transfer to the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Romania, which pleas were ultimately rejected. Following the newly adopted decision by the Romanian Holy Synod (February 2024), the Head of Moldova’s Orthodox Church Met. Vladimir sent a letter to the Romanian Patriarch Daniel at the beginning of March asking for dialogue but also pointing a critical finger, alleging material gains for priests who transition into the Metropolis of Bessarabia.
The ROC is short of options regarding the resurgence of the Romanian church. Perhaps Met. Vladimir’s feeling of abandonment by the Russian church is not an isolated case. From the Baltics through to Ukraine and Moldova, the ROC’s near-abroad is slowly disintegrating, making room for other actors to fill the vacuum created.
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Till next week,
Andreja